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Abstract 
In the last few decades, immigration policy has once again risen to the forefront of United 
States politics. A 2018 Gallup poll found that up to a fifth of U.S. residents identify 
immigration as “the most important problem” facing the country.1 Despite high issue 
prioritization in the mass public, political elites have been unable to implement policy 
changes to confront what the public views as a problem. 
 
This thesis aims to better understand a) how the voting population’s immigration policy 
preferences have shifted in the last decade, b) how politics, geography, and immigrant 
interaction play a role in these shifts, and c) how other major discernable factors such as state 
median age and unemployment rate covary with policy preferences. In order to understand 
these concepts, it is necessary to provide a brief account of U.S. immigration history, explore 
some of the existing theoretical frameworks, and consider the disconnect between public 
policy and public opinion.  
 
  
                                                
1 Frank Newport and Gallup, Inc, Immigration Surges to Top of Most Important Problem List, (2018). 
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Background 
The U.S. is often called “a nation of immigrants” because most U.S. citizens, excluding 
Native Americans, descend from other nations and heritages. Throughout history, the U.S. 
has heavily relied on immigrants for much of the country’s economic and population growth. 
However, I place the phrase in “scare quotes” because the U.S. has historically accepted only 
certain types of “desirable” immigrants. This section explores the history of U.S. 
immigration policy to understand how it informs today’s immigration policy debate. 
 
Discriminatory Immigration Practices 
The U.S. has always favored certain groups of immigrants over others, a strange irony for “a 
country of immigrants.” For example, U.S. founders Benjamin Franklin and Thomas 
Jefferson -- both of British heritage -- wrote of German inferiority in their respective works. 
Jefferson critiqued Germans for choosing to settle in clusters, writing that they should instead 
choose to distribute themselves amongst the population in order to assimilate.2 Franklin took 
a more direct approach, characterizing German immigrants to the U.S. as “generally of the 
most ignorant Stupid Sort of their own Nation” in a letter written in 1753.3 Though this anti-
German sentiment was not translated into law, many other influential political figures with 
anti-immigrant views successfully translated their views into policy. 
 
                                                
2 Thomas Jefferson and H. A. Washington, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson: Being His Autobiography, 
Correspondence, Reports, Messages, Addresses, and Other Writings, Official and Private, (New York, John C. 
Riker, 1853). 
3 Benjamin Franklin, Founders Online: From Benjamin Franklin to Peter Collinson, (National Archives and 
Records Administration, 1753). 
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Racially discriminatory laws and practices have marred the United States’ immigration 
policy history. Just three years after signing the Constitution, the 1790 Naturalization Act 
moved to exclude non-white naturalization.4 Eight years later, the Alien Friends Act and 
Alien Enemies Act each worked to legalize deportation.5 The same year brought the Sedition 
Act, which criminalized false criticisms of the U.S. government. These four acts 
foreshadowed a long line of restrictive policies meant to favor particular types of immigrants 
and exclude others. 
 
Four policies shaped the immigration scene of the 1800s: the Immigration Act of 1864, the 
Naturalization Act of 1870, the Asian Exclusion Act, and the Chinese Exclusion Act. The 
Immigration Act of 1864 encouraged immigration due to post-Civil War labor shortages, and 
the Naturalization Act of 1870 allowed African American residents to naturalize. These two 
policies promoted immigration and resulted in a higher naturalization rate than had 
previously been recorded. The latter two, the Asian Exclusion Act of 1875 and Chinese 
Exclusion Act of 1882, laid the groundwork for explicit discrimination against individuals 
from Asia who hoped to immigrate to the United States. These Exclusion Acts persisted until 
the 1943 Magnuson Act, which repealed the Exclusion Acts, created a path to citizenship for 
Chinese residents, and permitted slightly more than 100 Chinese immigrants per year.  
 
The 1900s yielded different policies aimed to attract particular demographics and target 
newly-introduced quotas. For example, the Johnson-Reed Act of 1924 favored immigration 
                                                
4 D’Vera Cohn, How U.S. Immigration Laws and Rules Have Changed through History, (Pew Research Center, 
2015). 
5 Daniel J. Tichenor, Dividing Lines: The Politics of Immigration Control in America, (New Jersey, University 
Presses of California, Columbia and Princeton, 2002), 54. 
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from northern and western European countries while the 1952 Immigration and Nationality 
Act removed race as a disqualifier altogether.6 This era of policy saw a shift in racial 
preferences, moving the policy-based racial discrimination away from Asia and towards 
Mexico and Central America. Throughout this time period, racial discrimination within 
immigration also became less overt. 
 
Bracero Agreement and IRCA 
Congressional committees, bureaucracies, and interest groups comprise “iron triangles”. In 
the 1930s, an iron triangle based in the south and southwest parts of the U.S. supported 
Mexican labor importation. The entities believed that Mexican labor was the optimal choice 
because laborers could return to Mexico and as such would not settle in the United States.7 
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Bracero Agreement of 1942 formalized this triangle to mitigate farm 
labor shortages during World War II.8 The program allowed Mexican individuals to visit the 
U.S. to complete short-term agricultural work. Despite being the U.S.’s largest guest worker 
program, the Bracero Program developed a controversial reputation because farmers 
exploited it to contract cheaper labor. In 1964, Congress ended the Bracero Program after 
years of contentious extensions. 
 
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, more Mexican individuals entered the U.S. in search of 
greater economic opportunity.9 Many of the men became “economic agents” for their 
families back in Mexico, which prompted further migration to the United States. Eventually, 
                                                
6 U.S. Department of State, The Immigration Act of 1924 (The Johnson-Reed Act). 
7 Daniel J. Tichenor, Dividing Lines: The Politics of Immigration Control in America, 152. 
8 Center for History and New Media, About the Bracero Program, Bracero History Archive.  
9 Alex Shashkevich, Analyzing Undocumented Mexican Migration in U.S., (Stanford News, 2018). 
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U.S. citizens and their government noticed this mass migration. By the late 1970s, the U.S. 
began taking steps to control the situation.  
 
The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) has been one of the most relevant 
pieces of U.S. immigration policy to date. The legislation, signed into law by Ronald Reagan 
and sometimes derisively referred to as the Reagan Amnesty, granted a path to citizenship for 
the undocumented individuals who had continuously resided in the U.S. since 1982. IRCA 
also legalized certain agricultural workers, penalized employers who knowingly hired 
undocumented individuals, and increased U.S. border enforcement by building walls at the 
most prolific entrance points.10,11  
 
1990s, 2000s, and 2010s 
Following IRCA, immigration policy became more accepting and sought to provide 
exceptions for particular circumstances. Under President H.W. Bush, the Immigration Act of 
1990 altered immigration policy and transformed it into the structure we see today, though 
minor variations have been implemented throughout the years. This act increased the annual 
immigration cap to 700,000 total individuals and created the Diversity Visa, which acts as a 
lottery for applicants around the world wherein winners are granted a path to citizenship. 
Temporary Protected Status allows immigrants from disaster-ridden countries to seek 
temporary refuge in the U.S. until their home country can support them again.  
 
                                                
10 Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), (USCIS). 
11 EEOC, IRCA, (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 1986). 
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Since the reforms of the late 1980s and early 1990s, little immigration reform has passed 
through Congress. The sparse policy that has been written into law largely revolves around 
border security and program modernization to account for today’s technologically-advanced 
society. For example, the Secure Fence Act of 2006 authorized about 700 miles of fences 
along the U.S-Mexico border but has not been carried out due to lack of funding.12 There 
have been a number of failed pushes to further increase border patrol and improve border 
security between the U.S. and Mexico.  
 
The DREAM Act and DACA 
The Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act, or the DREAM Act, is an 
unsuccessful U.S. legislative proposal that has been reintroduced multiple times throughout 
the last two decades. If passed, the legislation would create a conditional path to citizenship 
for certain undocumented immigrants who were brought to the U.S. in their youth.  
 
In response to Congress’ inability to act, President Obama enacted a program called Deferred 
Action for Childhood Arrivals, or DACA, in 2010. Starting in 2012, individuals who entered 
the U.S. without documentation after 1981 while under the age of 16 became eligible to 
enroll in the program. DACA provides program participants with work authorization and 
temporarily prevents deportation. Participants must re-enroll every two years, and program 
acceptance depends on good standing.13 
 
                                                
12 Peter T. King, H.R.6061 - 109th Congress (2005-2006): Secure Fence Act of 2006, (Congress.gov, 2006). 
13 Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), (USCIS, 2016).  
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DACA stands in a unique space separate from other immigration policy issues. Unlike most 
immigration initiatives of the last fifty years, it has become a highly partisan issue. President 
Barack Obama implemented it, and Republicans, most notably President Donald Trump, 
have castigated it. As a result, many people have developed strong opinions about the 
program. Fake news sources circulate misinformation about DACA, which more reputable 
news sources rarely dispute effectively. Additionally, DACA benefits from having ambitious 
college-aged participants who bring positive attention to the program. This combination of 
high issue relevance, public opinion polarization, and misinformation pervasiveness 
separates DACA from the remainder of immigration policy.  
 
Immigration Theory 
There are two distinct aspects of the immigration process: first, the physical movement from 
country of origin to the new “host” country; and second, the integration into the host 
country’s society and culture.14 For policymakers, the former is termed “immigration theory” 
while the latter is “immigrant theory”. Each state implements its own policies pertaining to 
immigrant integration within society, resulting in a wide range of policies that interact with 
one another. Statewide immigrant policies also interact with federal immigration policy. In 
some cases, the interactions are antagonistic while in others they are more synergistic.  
 
Immigration policy can either be expansive or restrictive. An expansive one promotes 
immigration and a restrictive one looks to limit or cut off immigration, especially from 
certain regions. According to Tichenor, no “neutral option” exists because any effort to 
                                                
14 Summerlin-Long, Jeffrey. "State and Local." PLCY 349: Immigration Policy in the U.S.. Lecture, 2017. 
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maintain the status quo inevitably creates new structures to combat change, which, in turn, 
changes the structure of immigration.15 Immigration policy can also be expansive or 
restrictive towards immigrant rights, wherein expansive policy strives to grant immigrants 
close to full citizenship rights and restrictive policy does not.16 The U.S.’s consistently high 
intake of immigrants points to an expansive policy overall, but the limitations put on certain 
geographic areas point to restrictive tendencies. 
 
Immigration & Public Opinion Today 
An issue’s salience for the public depends on context. This thesis’ second sentence, which 
noted that a fifth of U.S. residents believed immigration was the most important problem at 
the moment, illustrates this point exceedingly well. The Gallup poll is administered monthly, 
and the salience of immigration has differed significantly over time. The results from July 
2018 found that 22% prioritized immigration, but, in June, that percentage was less than half 
of that at 10%.17 While immigration policy is clearly still important, public opinion shifts 
constantly because it is contextualized by current events. Thus, public opinion cannot be 
measured at one time; it must instead be aggregated and viewed over time to understand how 
the context has changed. 
 
Generally speaking, public opinion polls find that U.S. residents view immigrant groups 
more positively as generations pass. For example, many groups that immigrated to the U.S. 
about a century ago were discriminated against and strongly disliked at the time of 
                                                
15 Daniel J. Tichenor, Dividing Lines: The Politics of Immigration Control in America, 7. 
16 Terri Givens and Adam Luedtke. The Politics of European Union Immigration Policy: Institutions, Salience, 
and Harmonization, (Policy Studies Journal, 2004). 
17 Frank Newport and Gallup, Inc, Immigration Surges to Top of Most Important Problem List, (2018). 
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immigration, but today are considered a benefit to society. In the same vein, the general 
populace views today’s immigrant groups more negatively.  
 
Historical literature suggests that U.S. immigration policy and public opinion are often at 
odds with one another.18 When the public supported expansive policy, government was more 
likely to have implemented a comparatively restrictive policy, and vice versa.  
 
A number of other factors influence immigration public opinion. Many of these influences 
were included as control variables in the analysis in order to pinpoint covariation. They are 
listed and explained in the Data and Methods section. 
 
This Thesis 
Just as new immigration legislation has been limited in recent decades, so has research on 
immigration policy. Most recent research has focused on the impact of immigration via 
theoretical research or utilizing an economic-based approach. The latter, in particular, 
extends an everlasting debate on the economic advantage or disadvantage of immigration. 
Through all of this, research and society itself do not fully understand society’s opinion of 
immigration, nor does academic research approach U.S. immigration from a geographic, 
state-based perspective. This thesis endeavors to explore immigration policy public opinion 
using a quantitative approach and the state as the unit of analysis.   
                                                
18 Daniel J. Tichenor, Dividing Lines: The Politics of Immigration Control in America, 17. 
 12 
Data and Methods 
This section outlines the thesis dataset assembly process and the methods used to analyze the 
data. To access the full dataset and Stata do-file, please contact Amy Burton at 
acburton19@gmail.com. Two Excel files exist: one optimized for Excel, “Burton Excel”, and 
the other for Stata, “Burton Stata”.  
 
Dataset Assembly 
 
CCES Survey Questions 
I first worked to identify data that measures public opinion about immigration policy. 
Because this analysis takes place at the state level, data collections needed to be sufficiently 
large to include enough respondents in all fifty states to make meaningful comparisons. The 
Cooperative Congressional Election Study, or CCES, fulfilled these requirements. The CCES 
is a national stratified sample survey of approximately 50,000 people that measures public 
opinion on a variety of issues.19 In order to accurately discern how elections shift public 
opinion, each “wave” of the CCES conducted during an election year consists of two sub-
waves, one before the election and another afterward. For non-election years, the survey has 
a single wave during the same time period. Because this study focuses on the importance of 
changing political context to understanding public opinion, it is also helpful that the CCES 
has asked the same questions about immigration across multiple waves. 
 
                                                
19 "Welcome." CCES: Cooperative Congressional Election Survey. 
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Specifically, the CCES includes three questions about immigration across four waves of the 
data collection: 2007, 2010, 2014, and 2016. The three questions are as follows: 
 
Table 1. CCES questions and associated IDs 
 
Q# Question Phrasing CCES  Codebook ID 
Burton Excel 
ID 
Burton 
Stata ID 
Q1 
Grant legal status to all illegal immigrants 
who have held jobs and paid taxes for at 
least 3 years, and not been convicted of 
any felony crimes.  
2007: CC12x_2 
2010: CC322 
2014: CC14_322_1 
2016: CC16_331_1 
Q1_SFreq q1 
Q2 Increase the number of border patrols on the U.S.-Mexican border. 
2007: CC12x_4 
2010: CC322 
2014: CC14_322_2 
2016: CC16_331_2 
Q2_SFreq q2 
Q3 Fine U.S. businesses that hire illegal immigrants. 
2007: CC12x_1 
2010: CC322 
2014: CC14_322_4 
2016: CC16_331_4 
Q3_SFreq q3 
 
 
Because CCES data are collected at the individual level, I aggregated individuals’ responses 
to the three questions by state using Stata’s cross-tabulation command, which is coded as 
“tab var1 var2”. The binary outputs of each question made for three columns of interest for 
each question: number of individuals per state who selected “yes” (Q1_S), number of 
individuals per state who selected “no” (Q1_NS), and total individuals per state who 
responded to the survey (Q1_R). After being copied to Excel, the sum of Q1_S and Q1_NS 
served as a data entry check with total individuals responded.  
 
To obtain a comparable value by state, these responses translated into frequencies by Q1_S / 
Q1_R = Q1_SFreq. I repeated this process for each question and for each of the four CCES 
waves.  
 14 
Political Lean 
Over the last decade, immigration has become an increasingly partisan political issue. As 
such, it is important to control for the partisan composition of a state to avoid attributing the 
effect of partisanship to variables of interest. Given that the Republican party has become the 
anti-immigration party, I suspect that states that vote more Republican will also be less 
supportive of immigration. However, I could not create a standard variable to represent 
political lean. Of the CCES survey years, only 2016 is a presidential election year, so I would 
have needed to utilize state elections in order to get the most time-specific results. Because 
state election political platforms vary so widely, I recognized that I could not compare the 
%Democrat in Alabama to the same in %Hawaii. Hawaii’s Democratic candidate would run 
on a far more progressive platform than Alabama’s. Therefore, I needed to use Presidential 
elections in a way that represented non-election years.  
 
I decided to make Political Lean a fixed effect variable, which means that one value applies 
to a state across all four years of interest. To create this variable, state election results from 
2004, 2008, and 2012 were inputted as a measure between 0 (all voting Republican) and 100 
(all voting Democrat). The 2016 election was omitted because a) it occurred at the end of 
2016 and therefore does not necessarily represent the entirety of the year, and b) because so 
many individuals broke party alliances for the election, the inclusion of these results would 
skew the overall averages. The three elections averaged to create an index of mean political 
lean. Though an average might mask some smaller statewide shifts, significant shifts in 
political lean are reflected in the average.  
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Region 
States’ geographic situation also has the potential to be important to understanding 
immigration attitudes. A 2017 study found that anti-immigration policies proliferate 
regionally in the U.S., particularly in the Southeast region.20 Here, I use the U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis’ preset regional division (see below, Figure 1). This particular map 
represents this study’s regions for two reasons: first, the federal government has fewer 
outside motivations that could introduce bias into the study; second, the map grouped 
Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas together in the Southwest category. These three states have 
the most miles directly connected to the U.S.-Mexico border, which acts as a relevant 
component of geography in this study. I suspect that the Southwest region will have more 
polarized policy views, but am unsure whether they will be pro- or anti-immigration.  
 
  
                                                
20 Yalidy Matos, "Geographies of Exclusion: The Importance of Racial Legacies in Examining State-Level 
Immigration Laws", (American Behavioral Scientist 61, no. 8, 2017), 808-31. 
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Figure 1. Regional Divisions. Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis21 
 
 
The Far West category includes Hawaii and Alaska. For the regressions, Southeast 
intentionally serves as the reference category for the model in order to form a null to which 
the other categories can be compared. The Southeast acts as the null due to the region’s 
suspected anti-immigrant sentiment. 
 
Legal Permanent Resident Measures 
A 2004 NPR poll found that native-born U.S. citizens who interact with immigrants less are 
more likely to view immigrants negatively.22 For this study, the measure %Legal Permanent 
Residents captures the potential amount of interaction that respondents have with 
                                                
21 "Regional Economic Accounts: About Regional." U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). 
22 NPR, Kaiser, and Kennedy School. "Summary of Findings: Immigration." NPR. 2004.  
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immigrants. A higher percentage of legal permanent residents in a state increases the chances 
that non-immigrants will have the opportunity to interact with immigrants. 
 
The number of legal permanent residents (LPRs) by state was taken from the Department of 
Homeland Security, LPR 2016, Table 4. Because states vary widely by population, I divided 
the number of LPRs by the total population per state, which I found through the American 
Community Survey (ACS). I repeated this process for the four waves of CCES data. 
 
Other Variables of Interest 
In addition, I calculated a range of other control variables to isolate the effects of variables of 
interest. I list them below in Table 2 alongside their code IDs within the data files. Table 3 
details the rationale for including them in the models, how I coded them, and the sources 
from which they were drawn. 
 
  
 18 
Table 2. Control variables and associated IDs 
 
Title Burton Excel 
Codebook ID 
Burton Stata 
Codebook ID 
Regression ID 
Race 
● White 
● Black 
● Asian 
● Islander 
● Native 
● Other 
● Latinx 
● whitepct 
● blackpct 
● asianpct 
● islanderpct 
● nativepct 
● otherpct 
● latinx 
● %White 
● N/A 
● N/A 
● N/A 
● N/A 
● N/A 
● %Latinx 
Median Household Income Median House 
Income 
p50income Median Income  
(in thousands) 
State Unemployment Rate State Unemp unemppct %Unemployed 
SPLC Hate Group Tally SPLC Tally splc SPLC Hate Group 
Tally 
Median Age Median Age p50age Median Age 
Political Lean* Political Lean dempct %Democrat 
Urban / Rural* Urban/Rural urbanpct %Urban 
Lumina Education Index* Lumina lumina Lumina Foundation Ed 
Profile 
 
Variables with a * beside them are fixed: they were only captured once per state and do not 
change by wave. Urban/Rural was only captured by the 2010 U.S. Census; however, because 
today’s urbanization occurs at very slow speeds, any variation between years would have 
been minimal. Likewise, Lumina did not offer year-based indexes. Because Lumina 
measures a massive education infrastructure, I made the assumption that education 
infrastructure does not shift significantly per year. 
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Table 3. Control Variables, Inclusion Rationales, Coding Explanations, and Data Sources 
 
Title Inclusion Rationale Coding Explanation Data Source 
Race 
Race is a common indicator of 
policy attitudes and voting 
outcomes.  
A significant percentage of 
Latinx residents believe that 
the U.S. should admit fewer 
immigrants.23 
%White and %Latinx are the 
percentage of each race found in a 
state on a scale of 0 to 100. 
ACS 1-Year Estimates 
Median 
Household 
Income 
Wealth is an insulator for 
economic pressure.24  
This control is a measure of 
wealth, or longer-term economic 
well-being, in thousands of U.S. 
dollars.  
U.S. Census Time-
Series 
State 
Unemploy- 
ment Rate 
Outside of racial prejudice, 
economic insecurity directly 
influences immigration policy 
attitudes.25  
This control is a measure of short-
term economic well-being on a 
scale between 0 and 100. 
ACS 1-Year Estimates 
SPLC Hate 
Group Tally 
As the term “immigrant” shifts 
closer to negatively-
stereotyped minority groups, 
immigration policy will be 
increasingly decided by racial 
prejudices.26  
This control measures those 
negative racial tensions by state via 
a summation of hate groups.  
Southern Poverty Law 
Center 
Median Age Age has been found to impact 
immigration policy 
attitudes.27,28  
This control measures average age 
by state to account for 
concentration-based opinion 
differences. 
ACS 1-Year Estimates 
Political 
Lean* 
Political ideology also 
influences immigration policy 
public opinion, separately 
from economic security, 
education, or racism.29  
On a scale between 0 (Republican) 
and 100 (Democrat), Political Lean 
endeavors to capture the voting 
tendencies of the state throughout 
the 2004, 2008, and 2012 elections.  
Election results, 
accessed at 
270towin.com/states 
                                                
23 Luis Noe-Bustamante and Ana Gonzalez-Barrera, "Fewer Latinos Now Say U.S. Has Too Many 
Immigrants", (Pew Research Center, 2019). 
24 Burns and Gimpel, "Economic Insecurity", 205. 
25 Ibid, 204. 
26 Ibid, 204. 
27 Charles R. Chandler and Yung-Mei Tsai, "Social Factors Influencing Immigration Attitudes: An Analysis of 
Data from the General Social Survey", (The Social Science Journal 38, no. 2, 2001) 177-88. 
28 Katherine Fennelly, "Why Immigration Worries Americans – Especially Rural Residents" (Scholars Strategy 
Network - Basic Facts, 2012). 
29 Burns and Gimpel, "Economic Insecurity", 205. 
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Urban / 
Rural* 
Increasing rurality has been 
linked with stronger anti-
immigrant attitudes.30  
On a scale between 0 (rural) and 
100 (urban), this variable looks at 
population distribution by state. 
U.S. Census, 2010 
Lumina 
Education 
Index* 
Increased education has been 
linked to higher levels of 
tolerance for immigrants.31  
On a scale between 0 (uneducated) 
and 100 (well-educated), this 
variable evaluates states by their 
educational systems and 
attainment. 
Lumina Foundation  
 
 
Although the meaning of many of the variables is self-evident, one requires more 
explanation. 
 
Lumina Education Index 
The Lumina Foundation is an education foundation “committed to making opportunities for 
learning beyond high school available to all”.32 One of their initiatives, Stronger Nation, used 
2016 data to measure post-secondary educational attainment by state as an index measuring 
from 0 to 100. This index had a national average of 46.9, which showed that the index was 
not too stringent or lenient. This control functions as a proxy for average educational 
attainment. I anticipate that higher educational attainment will be linked with higher support 
for pro-immigration policy and less support for anti-immigration policy.  
 
  
                                                
30 Katherine Fennelly and Christopher Federico, "Rural Residence as a Determinant of Attitudes Toward US 
Immigration Policy" (International Migration 46, no. 1, 2008), 151-90. 
31 Burns and Gimpel 2000, page 205. 
32 Lumina Foundation.  
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Data Cleaning & Manipulation 
Following data collection, the data underwent iterative cleaning. Part of this process included 
assistance from data visualization librarian Lorin Bruckner and Odum Institute ResearchHub 
Statistical Consultant Bailey.  
 
After importing the Excel file into Stata, I estimated a series of ordinary least squares 
regression models. The mean response by state by year to CCES questions served as the 
dependent variable with the remaining variables cast as explanatory variables. From the race 
category, I included only whitepct and latinxpct as controls due to concerns about collinearity 
causing statistical problems if I included other race variables. Though the two variables 
exhibited some collinearity, I felt confident that enough variation existed to find any 
discernable racially-based patterns. 
 
The third question of interest, fining businesses, had a small sample size in 2010. Here, 
Montana and Nebraska’s low or nonexistent response rates prompted omission. 
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Results 
Recall that the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) asked three questions to 
better understand public opinion about immigration. These questions also allow me to 
identify factors that influence these opinions. The CCES prefaced the three questions in the 
same way: “Should the U.S. government enact the following policy: [Question #]” Study 
participants responded either yes or no. 
 
To begin, I looked at CCES question support by year, which is shown below in Table 4. 
From this, I garnered an understanding of the general trends within each CCES question of 
interest.  
 
Table 4. CCES Question Percentage Support by Year 
 
Year Grant Legal 
Status 
Increase 
Border Patrol 
Fine 
Businesses 
2007 31.9744 55.34937 69.56453 
2010 38.2494 62.4829 74.03996 
2014 46.11484 57.56476 62.65957 
2016 54.7422 49.66244 65.80738 
 
 
The first policy of interest is: 
“Grant legal status to all illegal immigrants who have held jobs and paid taxes for at 
least 3 years, and not been convicted of any felony crimes.”  
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Effectively, this survey question asks whether people support granting legal status for 
undocumented immigrants. It does not use the inflammatory language or key phrases that 
prompt a party response rather than a personal opinion. This phrasing can be both an asset 
and a limitation because, while this question reveals how individuals feel about the topic 
when presented dispassionately, immigration is often not presented as such in real political 
dialogue. 
 
As shown in Figure 2, which appears to the right, 
public support for granting legal status increases 
steadily between 2007 and 2016. In 2007, the 
average statewide support for the policy was 
31.97%; in 2016, this number increased by 22.77 
percentage points to 54.74% support. 2007 had a 
wide range of responses: Massachusetts recorded 
50.45% public support while Wyoming recorded 
11.11%. In 2010, the average support in a state 
rose to 38.25%, with Vermont showing the most 
support at 63.04 and Idaho showing the least at 
27.38%. 2014’s results showed heightened public support again with a state average of 
46.11%. Hawaii had the highest support for granting legal status with 60.22%, and South 
Dakota had the lowest with 35.34% public support. 2016 recorded the highest average state 
support of the four years at 54.74%. The most supportive state was Maryland (60.67%) and 
the least supportive was West Virginia (46.62%). 
Figure 2. Granting Legal Status Public 
Support by Year 
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Because there are three years between waves 1 and 2, four years between waves 2 and 3, and 
only two years between waves 3 and 4, the approximately 8-point gap between each wave 
means that the question has garnered support at a higher rate between the last two waves than 
in previous iterations.  
 
As identified in Data and Methods, political lean should play a large role in affecting public 
support for immigration policies. Because the Democrats are the pro-immigration party of 
the early 2000s, a higher percentage of Democrats in a state should increase support for 
granting legal status in that state. Therefore, I created a scatterplot comparing %Democrat to 
public support for granting legal status, shown below in Figure 3. Because %Democrat is an 
index of Presidential elections, the variable would not properly show variation over time. As 
such, this scatterplot shows each state’s average public support for granting legal status over 
the four waves of interest. 
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Figure 3. Granting Legal Status Percentage Support by Percent Democrat 
Line of Best Fit: Q1 Support = 0.33*%Dem +26.61 | R2=0.52 
 
Figure 3 shows that more Democrat-leaning states have higher support for granting legal 
status. For example, states with higher Republican voting tendencies such as Wyoming and 
Idaho are shown on the left half of the graph and have 36.60 and 36.31 percent average 
support for this policy, respectively. On the other hand, Hawaii and Vermont tend to vote for 
Democrats at high rates; these states have 46.87 and 65.80 percent average support for 
granting legal status. The two states closest to the 50% x-axis marker, swing states Florida 
and Virginia, have 44.09% and 44.42% public support, respectively. Both political lean and 
public support vary widely in this figure, and the trend line captures a large amount of 
covariation.  
 
The trend line accounts for most, but certainly not all, of the variation within the graph. In the 
top left corner of the graph, Utah sits alone as the outlier. Utah is extremely conservative 
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with 47.34% public support for granting legal status. This high support could be attributed to 
Utah’s religious uniquity or the state’s significantly younger median age. 
 
Party is likely only one of many areas that affects support for immigration. Another potential 
source of variation is region of the country. I expect that states further away from the U.S.-
Mexico border will have lower support for pro-immigration policy since residents of these 
states face immigration-related issues less frequently. In order to better understand these 
overarching trends, the data visualization below showcases the continental U.S. state 
averages for each of the four waves. The legend beside the graph indicates the range of 
public opinion outputs by state with the same gradient standardized for each wave. 
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Figure 4. Geographic visualization of public support for granting legal status per wave of the CCES 
 
 
Note first how the map gradually darkens throughout the four iterations, which reflects the 
increased support for the policy. Second, the Midwest has slightly lighter colors throughout 
the visualization. Perhaps this is due to a sense of resentment from agricultural workers in the 
region. Because of this difference, regions will likely have a significant impact on attitudes, 
even after controlling for other factors in a regression. 
 
Finally, recall that my key variable of interest is people’s experience with those who are 
immigrants. I operationalized potential contact with immigrants with the percentage of legal 
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permanent residents within each state. Below, I plot this measure across states with the 
percentage of people from those states who support granting legal status. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Granting Legal Status Percentage Support by Percent Legal Permanent Resident Line of 
Best Fit: Q1 Support = 18.23*%LPR + 38.41 | R2=0.09 
 
 
Figure 5 finds that higher percentages of legal permanent residents within a state loosely 
correlate with higher support for granting legal status. States on the left side of the figure 
have lower LPR frequencies. For example, Montana in 2007 has a %LPR of 0.06% and 
39.39% public support, which puts the point directly on the trend line. Further right, Florida 
in 2014 partially touches the trend line; the state’s higher %LPR (0.55%) corresponds with 
48.80% public support for granting legal status. Public support varies much more widely than 
does %LPR, and the trend line does not capture much of this vertical variation. That said, 
%LPR’s lack of variation also limits the significance of the graph since the states range from 
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0.0393 (West Virginia) to 0.8097 (New York). This limited range of %LPR, wide range of 
public support, and wide variation from the trend line confirms that %LPR likely does not 
strongly influence public support for granting legal status. 
 
Now that I have identified several of the main factors that influence how the public supports 
granting legal status, I will repeat this process for the second CCES question.  
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The second policy from the CCES is:  
“Increase the number of border patrols on the U.S.-Mexican border”.  
Unlike the previous model, higher responses here signal anti-immigration policy views. 
Additionally, note that the question measures the proportion of individuals who want to 
increase, not maintain, patrols.  
 
This policy’s public opinion is not necessarily an inversion of the previous one, which 
suggests that citizens think about immigration issues in different ways. For example, in the 
1980s, IRCA created both a path to citizenship and a physical barrier to stop new individuals 
from crossing over the border. This policy strove to improve life for those already in the U.S. 
but simultaneously cut off the opportunity for people to continue exploiting the system.  
 
Public opinion on increasing border patrol looks to 
have fluctuated throughout the study period. The 
first year of interest, 2007, had an average public 
support level of 55.35%. In this year, Vermont had 
significantly less support than other states with 
28.00% public support. Wyoming (72.22%) had the 
highest support of any state. 2010 recorded 62.48% 
support on average with a much smaller range of 
responses. Alabama (69.84%) had the highest 
support and Vermont (50.00%) had the lowest 
support. In 2014, the average state had 57.56% of the Figure 6. Increasing Border 
Patrol Public Support by Year 
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public’s support. State support ranged from Hawaii with 47.31% to Mississippi with 66.40%. 
Finally, 2016 showed the average as 49.66%, with state public support percentages ranging 
from 43.53% (California) to 57.58% (West Virginia).  
 
2007 stands as a time of high variation and low consensus on the topic; as time passes, this 
variation decreases. In 2010, both increasing border patrol and fining businesses had higher 
public support for their respective policies than in any other CCES wave. This is likely due to 
the Great Recession and its economic stressors; the event triggered a seemingly short wave of 
anti-immigrant sentiment. Following 2010, support for increasing border patrol has dropped 
steadily. This decrease in support led to a 2016 average of 49.7%, which creates a distinct 
split within U.S. residents who do and do not support the proposed policy. 
 
As with the analysis above, political lean should account for some of variation in support. 
Since increasing border patrol inherently counts as anti-immigrant, I anticipate higher 
support for the policy from increasingly Republican states.  
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Figure 7. Increase Border Patrol Percentage Support by Percent Democrat 
Line of Best Fit: Q2 Support = -0.31*%Dem +71.23 | R2=0.49 
 
 
As Figure 7 shows, increasing Democrat sway results in lower support for increasing border 
patrol. The two most Republican-leaning states, Utah and Wyoming, had 53.69% and 
59.48% respective public support for the policy. On the right-hand side of the figure, 
Vermont and Hawaii were the most Democrat-leaning and had 44.11 and 47.05 percent 
public support, respectively. Florida and Virginia took the central ground with 57.18% and 
55.74%, respectively. Figure 7 may be better represented by a quadratic equation or other 
curved equation given the scatterplot’s inverted U shape. 
 
States with direct access to the border, California, New Mexico, Arizona, and Texas, were 
not outliers on this question. Texas and Arizona polled only slightly above the line of best fit 
while California and New Mexico fell below the line. However, given that Texas and 
Arizona vote Republican at a higher rate while California and New Mexico lean Democrat, a 
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line of best fit with only these four states yields a stronger relationship between increase 
border patrol and %Democrat.  
 
To better understand the regional differences in public support for increasing border patrol, I 
made a geographic visualization to compare state public support over time. I expect that the 
Midwest will maintain more anti-immigrant sentiment than their regional neighbors. 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Geographic visualization of public support for increased border patrol per wave of the 
CCES 
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Unlike granting legal status, increased border patrol experiences both growth and decline in 
public support during this time period. As explained above, the increase in public support in 
2010 likely points to the Great Recession; the decrease in support since that period 
corresponds with the economic recovery that has taken place since then. 2016’s map shows 
significantly lower support for the policy than any other iteration, including 2007.  
 
In 2007, 2014, and 2016, the Midwest region has some of the darkest colors, signaling higher 
public support for increased border patrol. Comparatively, the Far West region, New Mexico, 
and Vermont have lighter colors than their surroundings throughout all four waves.  
 
A large amount of the variation seen thus far has not yet been explained, so I also looked at 
%LPR by state to understand what impact immigrant interaction has on increasing public 
support for enhanced border patrol. I anticipate a negative relationship between %LPR and 
public support because immigrants are unlikely to advocate for a more difficult immigration 
path. 
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Figure 9. Increase Border Patrol Percentage Support by Percent Legal Permanent Resident 
Line of Best Fit: Q2 Support = -13.98*%LPR +59.61 | R2=0.11 
 
 
As expected, higher levels of %LPR by state correlates with lower public support for 
increased border patrol. In 2010, Wyoming recorded 58.02% public support with 0.0801% 
LPR within the state’s population. New Jersey in 2007 had a significantly higher %LPR of 
0.64% and a lower public support percentage of 51.56.  
 
Though the trend line seems to capture most of the data’s variation, it’s worth noting that the 
points are largely clustered on the left half of the graph, signifying lower %LPRs. For 
example, Louisiana’s 2010 survey found 65.82% supported increased border patrol with 
0.0968% LPR; but at 0.0974% LPR, Alabama in 2010 reported 51.01% support. Even though 
both states have very similar %LPRs, their results vary widely.  
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A fewer number of points on the right-hand side of the graph likely have more influence over 
the trend line. Just as in the previous CCES policy question, the small range of %LPRs limits 
the practical application of this relationship. 
 
This graph’s outlier is Vermont in 2007 with a %LPR of 0.1273 and the lowest public 
support of any state at 28.00%. In 2016, Vermont’s support had increased to 45.45%. The 
four points furthest to the right are New York over the four waves with the furthest right 
being in 2016. 
 
I again repeated this process for the third policy of interest, attitudes about businesses who 
hire individuals who are in the country illegally.  
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The CCES phrased the third question as:  
“Fine businesses that hire illegal immigrants.” 
Like the previous question, this is also a measure of anti-immigrant sentiment. Unlike either 
of the other questions, this CCES question relates to the business aspect of immigration. 
Some people might support fining business if they harbor negative feelings towards 
immigrants or if they dislike businesses and want to see them held accountable. As such, 
answers to this question are the least likely to conform to a party platform. 
 
The 2010 iteration of the CCES had a lower sample size than the other waves of the study. 
This especially applies to this third question, wherein some of the states’ 2010 results had to 
be omitted due to low sample size. I withheld these results from both the geographic 
visualizations. In addition, the subsequent regression has 48 of the 50 data points from the 
2010 wave; the other waves had large sample sizes, which allowed me to include all states.  
 
Figure 10 shows majority support for fining businesses that 
hire undocumented immigrants. In 2007, the average state 
had 69.56% support for fining businesses, with Kansas 
(82.42%) measuring the highest support and Vermont 
(48.00%) showing the least. 2010’s surge of anti-immigrant 
support led to a higher mean of 74.04%. In this year, Idaho 
(94.12%) and Nevada (92.59%) had the highest support 
while Alaska (25.00%) and Hawaii (40.00%) had the lowest. 
2014 showed the lowest levels of support for fining 
Figure 10. Fining Businesses 
Public Support by Year 
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businesses out of the four years with an average of 62.66% support; here, South Dakota had 
the highest support with 72.18% and New York had the lowest with 51.77%. In 2016, the 
average increased to 65.81%, which is only 5 percentage points lower than the 2007 survey’s 
average. South Dakota showed the most support for fining businesses with 80.00% and 
Vermont showed the lowest with 54.55%. 
 
Fine businesses has an unknown trend and points to a general lack of consensus among the 
general populace. The wide range of public support percentages has no obvious path forward 
and may vary in any number of ways in future surveys as public knowledge about fining 
businesses oscillates. 
 
In order to pinpoint some of the factors influencing this CCES question, I first turned to 
political lean. 
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Figure 11. Fine Businesses Percentage Support by Percent Democrat 
Line of Best Fit: Q3 Support = -0.20*%Dem +76.90 | R2=0.09 
 
 
Figure 11 shows a weak negative correlation between increasing Democrat support and 
support for fining businesses. While the trend line captures the general direction of 
movement as %Democrat increases, it does not capture the majority of variation in public 
support. Likewise, %Democrat fails to differentiate states’ public support for this CCES 
question. Wyoming and Iowa, for example, respectively record 71.42% and 71.53% public 
support for fining businesses, but Wyoming leans strongly Republican with %Democrat at 
30.60% while Iowa leans slightly Democrat at 52.50%.  
 
Three states with moderate Republican lean, Nebraska, Alaska, and Montana, have 
significantly lower support for fining businesses than the rest of the states and likely skew the 
trend line downward.  
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Given that partisanship is not strongly related to support for fining businesses, other variables 
must play a more sizable role. Because anti-immigrant policies can cluster subnationally, 
region could account for this variation. To test this theory, I created the same geographic 
visualization as in the previous CCES questions. I hypothesize that states without access to a 
coast or country border will have higher levels of support because their lower levels of 
immigrant interaction will make these states less sympathetic when considering immigrant-
focused policies. 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Geographic visualization of public support for fine businesses per wave of the CCES 
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As with increased border patrol, this geographic visualization shows that fining businesses 
experienced a significant bump in support in the 2010 iteration, but support dipped in 
subsequent surveys. States with direct access to a border look to have only minimally lower 
support for fining businesses. Besides this, Figure 12 does not uncover any additional major 
trends of interest.  
 
Perhaps %LPR will play a larger role in explaining support for fining businesses that hire 
illegal immigrants. I expect that higher %LPR will result in lower support for fining 
businesses given that immigrant populations, including LPRs, should have greater empathy 
for other members of the current immigrant population.  
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Figure 13. Fine Businesses Percentage Support by Percent Legal Permanent Resident 
Line of Best Fit: Q3 Support = -11.65*%LPR +70.76 | R2=0.05 
 
 
As seen above, the line of best fit seems to capture the general trend: higher %LPRs by state 
correspond with lower support for the policy. Two points directly on the line, Montana and 
New York, showcase this trend’s practical applicability. Montana in 2014 had a %LPR of 
0.04% and 69.79% public support for fining businesses. In 2010, New York reported a higher 
%LPR (0.76%) and lower support for fining businesses (61.65%). This 8% difference in 
public support could potentially be due to differing levels of immigrant interaction. 
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As with previous graphs comparing %LPR to public support, the narrow range in %LPR 
limits the utility of the wide range in public support. Fining businesses, unlike the other 
CCES questions studied, looks to have a stronger, possibly significant, correlation with 
%LPR.  
 
A fair number of outliers litter the graph, such as Alaska in 2010 with 25% support and 
Hawaii in 2010 with 40% support. Despite these outliers, this trend is still significant and 
should be further explored in the multivariate model. 
 
These three CCES policy questions all have intriguing correlations with political lean, region, 
and %LPR. In order to better understand which variables have a stronger influence, I ran an 
OLS regression for each question. Regression allows me to account for the independent 
influence of a range of different variables in the same model while controlling for the 
influence of the others. In addition to the three variables I have analyzed above in detail, I 
include a number of other variables as controls.  
 
%White, %Latinx, %Urban, and %Unemployed all capture percentages by state, measuring 
rates in order to be comparable across states of different population sizes. Median Income 
and Median Age measure the central counts while avoiding the skew associated with means. 
SPLC is a tally of hate groups in each state. Lumina is a standardized measure of state 
education systems. These variables, their collection, and my expected outcomes are further 
detailed in Data and Methods.  
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Table 5. Regression Outputs, Granting Legal Status 
 
Variable Coefficient 
(Std Error) 
t P>|t| 95% Confidence Intervals 
%Legal Permanent Res. 5.819359   
(4.009141) 
1.45 0.148 -2.091306     13.73002 
%White .0689927   
(.048927) 
1.41 0.160  -.027548     .1655333 
%Latinx  -.0218178 
(.0659809) 
-0.33 0.741 -.1520084     .1083728 
%Democrat .3608528* 
(.0832277) 
4.34 0.000  .1966315     .5250742 
%Urban  -.027958  
(.0423591) 
-0.66 0.510 -.1115391     .0556232 
%Unemployed  -.2376582    
(.1627055) 
-1.46 0.146  -.5587017     .0833853 
Median Income (in thousands) -.0018328  
(.0704339) 
-0.03 0.979  -.14081     .1371444 
Median Age -.9637013* 
(.2587527) 
-3.72 0.000  -1.474261    -.4531416 
SPLC Hate Group Tally .0117466 
(.026784) 
 0.44 0.661 -.0411025     .0645957 
Lumina Foundation Ed Profile  .2396803*   
(.1033099) 
2.32 0.021 .0358337     .4435269 
Year 2.52122* 
(.1179728) 
 21.37 0.000  2.288441     2.753999 
Regional Analysis        
  Far West  -.5813038   
(1.67818) 
-0.35 0.729 -3.892616     2.730009 
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  Rocky Mtns  -1.527376   
(1.692094) 
-0.90  0.368  -4.866142     1.811391 
  Southwest .6564126   
(1.883164) 
0.35  0.728 -3.059365     4.372191 
  Plains  -3.854415*   
(1.470184) 
-2.62  0.009  -6.755319     -.953512 
  Great Lakes  -.1896941  
(1.584697) 
-0.12 0.905  -3.31655     2.937161 
  Mideast -.1183279    
(1.656519) 
 -0.07  0.943 -3.386901     3.150245 
  New England  .3224711 
(1.982636) 
0.16 0.871  -3.589582     4.234524 
Constant -5024.016   
(234.1646) 
-21.46 0.000  -5486.06    -4561.973 
 
 
 
%Democrat, median age, Lumina education profile, and year all held statistical significance 
at the 95% CI within this model. All else held equal, increasing Democrat lean resulted in 
positive support for granting legal status. This positive relationship also stood for Lumina 
and year; increasing each variable individually led to higher public support. In contrast, 
higher median ages reduced support for granting legal status. Plains was the only region to 
garner statistical significance; state averages from this region were lower than other regions. 
Increased percentages of legal permanent residents in each state resulted in higher public 
support as expected. However, this variable fell short of statistical significance.  
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The results of the regression model largely follow expectations as it relates to the influence 
of key variables in the model. Take the influence of party. In this model, for every 1% 
increase in Democrat lean, the state’s support for granting legal status increased by 0.36 of a 
percentage point. The most Republican-leaning state, Utah (29.2%), and the most Democrat-
leaning state, Hawaii (66.4%), therefore have a 13.39 percentage-point gap in public opinion 
based solely on political lean, other things being equal. 
 
Year has the strongest covariation within this model, with each passing year resulting in a 2.5 
percentage point increase in support for granting legal status. Over the span of 2007 to 2016, 
this becomes a sizeable increase in support measuring 22.5 percentage points.  
 
Although age has not been a central focus thus far, it is influential within this model. As the 
median age of a state rises by 1 year, statewide support for granting legal status drops by 0.96 
percentage points. This becomes practically significant when looking at the wide range of 
median ages; for example, Texas’s low median age of 33.2 and Maine’s high median age of 
41.7 would have a 8.16 percentage-point difference due to median age. 
 
Lumina Foundation’s Education Profile also found statistical significance. For every 
percentage point increase on the Lumina profile, public opinion increased by 0.24 percentage 
points. West Virginia (34.7) has the lowest score and Massachusetts (56.2) has the highest. 
The 21.5 point range between the two generates a 5.16 percentage-point difference in public 
opinion attributable to education system strength. 
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Surprisingly, Plains is the singular region with a statistically significant relationship for this 
CCES question. States in this region, which include North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, 
Kansas, Minnesota, Iowa, and Missouri, consistently recorded support for granting legal 
status about 3.85 percentage points lower than the Southeast. Because no other region in the 
U.S. differed significantly from the Southeast, this public opinion difference is also 
applicable to the Far West, Rocky Mountains, Southwest, Great Lakes, Mideast, and New 
England regions. I hypothesized that the Southeast would poll as the least immigrant-
friendly, so Plains is an unexpected result. This anti-immigrant sentiment could be due to 
lower immigrant exposure throughout the region. Alternatively, the Plains’ overwhelmingly 
agricultural role could indicate that agricultural workers place immigrants in a negative light. 
 
Several variables do not hold statistical significance; these include %Unemployed, %Urban, 
and Median Income. %Unemployed and %Urban become significant in the latter two 
models, so their lack of significance here prompts special interest. Unemployment’s triviality 
here means that economic fluctuations are unlikely to impact public support. Also, the fact 
that urban and rural environments hold the same views suggests that increases in support are 
not due to a loud minority in either geographic subsect. Year also accounts for more of the 
covariation in this model before dropping to a less significant (though still relevant) position 
for the latter two CCES questions. Together, these variables confirm that granting legal status 
has a support system separate from other immigration policy topics. 
 
Median Income is not statistically significant in the first two models but becomes significant 
for the final model. In this model, Median Income and %Unemployed’s combined lack of 
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significance suggests that support for granting legal status may not depend on financial 
stability.  
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Table 6. Regression Outputs, Increase Border Patrol 
 
Variable Coefficient 
(Std Error) 
t P>|t| 95% Confidence Intervals 
%Legal Permanent Res. -8.144355 
(4.521466) 
-1.80 0.073 -17.06592     .7772074 
%White -.02948 
(.0551793) 
 -0.53  0.594 -.1383574     .0793975 
%Latinx -.0265591 
(.0744125) 
 -0.36 0.722  -.1733867     .1202684 
%Democrat -.4462427* 
(.0938633) 
-4.75 0.000 -.6314498    -.2610357 
%Urban  .1049522*  
(.0477721) 
2.20 0.029 .0106903      .199214 
%Unemployed 1.546644* 
(.1834975) 
8.43 0.000 1.184575     1.908714 
Median Income (in thousands) .0625212  
(.0794346) 
0.79 0.432 -.0942157     .2192582 
Median Age 1.060798* 
(.2918185) 
3.64 0.000 .4849943     1.636602 
SPLC Hate Group Tally  .0177285   
(.0302067) 
0.59 0.558   -.0418741     .0773311 
Lumina Foundation Ed Profile -.072086 
(.1165117) 
-0.62 0.537 -.3019819       .15781 
Year -.6102639* 
(.1330484) 
-4.59 0.000 -.8727893    -.3477385 
Regional Analysis       
  Far West  -1.95752 
(1.892633) 
 -1.03  0.302 -5.691982 1.776942 
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  Rocky Mtns 1.081035 
(1.908325) 
 0.57  0.572 -2.684389      4.84646 
  Southwest  1.664297 
(2.123812) 
 0.78  0.434 -2.526317     5.854911 
  Plains 5.770541* 
(1.658057) 
3.48 0.001 2.498934     9.042148 
  Great Lakes  -.2768301 
(1.787204) 
-0.15 0.877  -3.803264     3.249604 
  Mideast 2.273916 
(1.868205) 
1.22 0.225 -1.412345     5.960177 
  New England 1.241174 
(2.235996) 
0.56  0.580  -3.170797     5.653145 
Constant 1250.254 
(264.0883) 
4.73 0.000 729.1661     1771.342 
 
 
This regression found the following variables to be statistically significant: %Democrat, 
Median Age, Year, %Urban, and %Unemployed. %Democrat and Year both had negative 
relationships in which higher levels of the variable led to lower public support. Increasing 
any one of Median Age, %Urban, and %Unemployed prompted higher support for increasing 
border patrol. Additionally, the Plains region had significantly higher public support than 
other regions. Though not statistically significant at the 95% CI, %LPR’s t-value of -1.80 
means that the variable had practical significance, wherein higher percentages of LPRs in a 
state resulted in lower public support. 
 
%Democrat showed strong statistical significance again in this model. For each 1% increase 
in Democrat lean, support for increased border patrol dropped by 0.45 of a percentage point. 
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To put this into context, this model indicates that a Republican-leaning state with an average 
60/40 vote margin would support increased border patrol 9 percentage points more than a 
Democrat-leaning state with a 60/40 vote margin. 
 
Compared to the previous model, Year is far less significant. Though the variable still clearly 
plays a role in survey responses here, the variable accounts for less of the variation than for 
granting legal status. Here, the regression indicates that, for each additional year, support for 
border patrol drops by 0.61 of a percentage point. From 2007 to 2016, this translates to a 5.49 
drop in support. 
 
While not statistically significant, %LPR’s coefficient of -8.144 and -1.80 t-value hold 
practical significance. Take 2016, for example. New York’s %LPR of 0.81 is 0.76 percentage 
points higher than West Virginia’s 0.05. According to this regression model, this difference 
in %LPR accounts for a 6.19 percentage-point difference in public support for fining 
businesses. 
 
%Unemployed becomes significant in this model with each additional percentage point of 
unemployment corresponding with a 1.63 percentage point increase in support for border 
patrol. The controversial argument claiming that immigrants, especially illegal immigrants, 
take jobs from U.S. citizens logically results in a lower level of support from those who do 
not currently have jobs and may look to place blame elsewhere. 
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Median Age shows covariation that is both statistically and practically significant: for every 
1-year increase in a state’s median age, the support for border patrol increases by 1.06 
percentage points. In 2016, the gap between a state with an older median age, such as 
Maine’s median age of 44.5, compared to Oklahoma’s younger median age of 36.4 would be 
expected to have a 8.59 percentage point gap with Oklahoma less supportive of border patrol.  
 
Those in the Plains region support increased border patrol 5.77 percentage points more than 
the Southeast. Again, because none of the other regions differed significantly from the 
Southeast, this result can be extrapolated to say that the Plains region supports increased 
border patrol 5.77 percentage points more than the rest of the United States.  
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Table 7. Regression Outputs, Fine Businesses 
 
Variable Coefficient 
(Std Error) 
t P>|t| 95% Confidence Intervals 
%Legal Permanent Res. -15.62286* 
(6.86641) 
-2.28 0.024  -29.17238    -2.073337 
%White .1463427  
(.0840663) 
1.74 0.083  -.0195458     .3122312 
%Latinx .030003  
(.1133694) 
0.26 0.792 -.1937094     .2537154 
%Democrat  -.1819937   
(.1435162) 
-1.27  0.206 -.465195     .1012076 
%Urban  .210459*  
(.0724955) 
2.90  0.004 .0674033     .3535147 
%Unemployed 1.486165*   
(.2787454) 
5.33 0.000 .9361152     2.036215 
Median Income (in thousands)  .334365*   
(.1212747) 
2.76 0.006 .095053      .573677 
Median Age .4832335   
(.4479292) 
1.08 0.282 -.4006676     1.367135 
SPLC Hate Group Tally  .0469535  
(.0459518) 
1.02 0.308 -.0437234     .1376305 
Lumina Foundation Ed Profile -.3915718*   
(.1770166) 
-2.21 0.028 -.7408796     -.042264 
Year  -.9450847*   
(.2021746) 
-4.67 0.000 -1.344037    -.5461323 
Regional Analysis      
  Far West -5.827496*   
(2.89362) 
-2.01 0.046 -11.53749    -.1174991 
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  Rocky Mtns  .6360677   
(3.024848) 
0.21 0.834 -5.332881     6.605017 
  Southwest .048832    
(3.251116) 
 0.02  0.988 -6.366613     6.464277 
  Plains  6.909735*   
(2.552618) 
2.71 0.007  1.87264     11.94683 
  Great Lakes -2.445234   
(2.72032) 
-0.90 0.370  -7.813257     2.922789 
  Mideast -.8732111   
(2.83811) 
-0.31 0.759  -6.47367     4.727247 
  New England -2.95602  
(3.39755) 
-0.87 0.385  -9.660423     3.748383 
Constant 1925.465    
(401.3037) 
4.80 0.000  1133.57      2717.36 
 
 
Fining businesses relies on different variables than the prior two models. As foreshadowed 
by Figure 11, %Democrat was not statistically significant. Instead, a myriad of other 
variables influenced public support: %LPR, Lumina, Year, %Urban, %Unemployed, and 
Median Income. %LPR, Lumina, and Year each had a negative coefficient, meaning that 
increasing any one of them would result in lower public support. Conversely, %Urban, 
%Unemployed, and Median Income had positive relationships in which an increase in one 
related to an increase in public support.  
 
Regionally, Plains had significantly higher public support than surrounding areas. Far West 
also garnered statistical significance with lower public support than other regions. 
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%Legal Permanent Resident’s coefficient of 15.62 seems incredibly significant at first 
glance; however, because every state has <1% LPR in each wave, this result must be scaled 
back for correct interpretation. Consider West Virginia and New York: West Virginia’s 2010 
%LPR of 0.039 differs from New York’s 2010 % LPR of 0.763 by 0.724. When applying the 
coefficient to this, %LPR represents a 11.31 percentage point difference in public opinion 
with higher %LPR resulting in lower public support for the policy. 
 
For every percent increase in %Urban, support for fining businesses increases by 0.21. When 
comparing a state with low urban clustering, such as Maine in 2007, to a state with high 
urban concentration, such as California in 2007, the range accounts for a 8 percentage point 
difference in public opinion.  
 
Support for fining businesses increases by 1.49 percentage points for every percentage point 
increase in %Unemployed. In 2016, the range between New Hampshire’s low and 
Mississippi’s high unemployment rates comprises a 6.11 percentage point difference in 
public opinion, wherein Mississippi residents have greater support for fining businesses.  
 
Every thousand dollar increase in median income correlates with a public opinion increase of 
0.33 percentage points. Again, when comparing New Hampshire’s 2007 median income of 
67.58 thousand dollars and Mississippi’s 37.28 thousand dollars, median income becomes a 
practically significant variable representing a 10 percentage point gap in public opinion. 
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For every percentage point in Lumina, the support for fining businesses decreases by 0.38 
percentage points. The gap between West Virginia’s 34.7 and Colorado’s 55.7 results in a 
7.98 percentage point public opinion differentiation. 
 
Every year between 2007 and 2016, support for fining businesses dropped 0.95 percentage 
points. Over nine years, this becomes a 8.55 percentage point decrease in support. 
 
As in the prior two models, residents in the Plains region differ significantly from the 
remaining regions. In this particular model, this region supports fining businesses 6.91 
percentage points higher than elsewhere in the United States. Far West also garners 
significance in this model, but it moves in the opposite direction: residents in the region 
support fining businesses 5.83 percentage points less than in the Southeast and other 
statistically insignificant regions.  
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Limitations 
This project relies on secondary data. It would have been impossible for me to collect the 
data myself, but secondary data also comes with a hefty limitation: without collecting the 
data yourself, the collection methodology cannot ever be truly confirmed. Fortunately, the 
CCES has a relatively long history of high-quality work. It is not a true random cross-section 
of the American public, but it does approximate one. 
 
Below are a number of smaller, yet important limitations that might have introduced bias into 
the study. The CCES 2010 codebook phrases Question 3 as “fine businesses”; the other 
iterations phrase the question as “fine businesses that hire illegal immigrants”. A copy of the 
actual survey could not be located. It seems unlikely that the survey would change the sample 
question for that single wave of the study given that “fine businesses” is so vague as to be 
unanswerable. Therefore, I assumed that the survey phrased the question as “fine businesses 
that hire illegal immigrants”. All other questions had exact phrasing throughout all four 
waves.  
 
In addition, Question 3’s 2010 sample size is smaller than the remaining 2010 questions’ 
sample sizes, and 2010 sample sizes are smaller than the other three waves of the survey. For 
example, 2010 Q1 and Q2 each had a sample size of 2061 for the state of Ohio, but Q3 only 
had 113 observations. In 2007, Q3 had 395; in 2014, 2452; and in 2016, 473. This small 
sample size for 2010 Q3 may have resulted in samples that are less representative of the 
population.  
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Measuring education by state also presented a challenge. Because an education index by state 
could not be found through the U.S. government website, I used the Lumina index instead. 
Background research suggested that a) Lumina has no political partiality, and b) the 
organization utilized a methodology to measure not only outcomes but also infrastructure in 
each state. Additionally, Lumina’s index yielded similar results as education outcomes found 
by ACS surveys, which are reputable and used regularly in social sciences research. 
Although Lumina is a largely unknown actor that withheld their full index methodology from 
the public, there is no outward reason to discount its index’s validity. Still, the lack of 
methodological understanding warrants the label of limitation. 
 
For the Regions portion of the study, I struggled to place Hawaii and Alaska. The Far West 
category includes Hawaii and Alaska, but these states are physically remote from the other 
states in the category. In addition, Alaska’s more conservative politics departs from the rest 
of the region, which might have influenced Far West’s outputs within the regressions section.  
 
Finally, fixed effects may also limit the results. I recorded Political Lean, Urban/Rural, and 
Lumina Education only once and used those variables across the four study waves. The lack 
of variability could result in misallocated significance for the variables; however, this seems 
unlikely since all three measured long-term trends. For example, Urban/Rural on a state level 
shifts so slowly as to be invisible. Likewise, education infrastructure does not radically 
change in a decade; quick infrastructure shifts require a myriad of actors at different levels to 
synchronize their intentions. Because actors in education often have competing interests, 
education policy evolves incrementally. As explained earlier, the 2016 election would have 
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misrepresented Political Lean because voters broke party alliances. Because I hoped to 
measure political party alliance, I knew that the 2016 election would introduce too much bias 
into the results. Therefore, I chose to make the Political Lean variable a fixed effect. Though 
these three have limitations as fixed effects, I believe they would have greater limitations if 
they were not fixed. 
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Major Takeaways and Implications 
This section highlights some of the more practically significant results found in my project. 
Public support for granting legal status has increased markedly over the last decade. 
Policymakers should begin to weigh the long-term implications of either granting legal status 
or denying that path for an extended period of time with this rising public support. 
Republicans’ conservative position on this matter might become politically untenable. 
 
The first regression gauged public support for granting legal status to undocumented 
immigrants, which is a pro-immigrant policy proposal. Political lean, median age, 
educational system strength, and year were all statistically significant in the model. Year had 
the strongest relationship: moving forward by a year increased public support by 2.52 
percentage points. Political lean (0.36) and educational system strength (0.24) both also had 
positive coefficients. Median age had a negative relationship in which an added year resulted 
in a 0.96 percentage point loss in public support. States in the Plains region had lower public 
support by about 3.85 percentage points. 
 
Second, I ran a regression to test public support for increasing border patrol. In this model, 
political lean, median age, year, percent population in urban areas, and percent 
unemployment all achieved statistical significance. Because increasing border patrol is anti-
immigrant, political lean, median age, and year flipped their direction from the first model. 
Political lean had a negative relationship; a percentage point higher Democrat partisanship 
resulted in lower support by 0.45 of a percentage point. Likewise, each year had a 0.61 
percentage point drop in support, again suggesting that public opinion trends in a liberal 
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direction on immigration. A single year increase in median age accompanied a 1.06 
percentage point increase in public support. Percent urban (0.10) and unemployment (1.55) 
also had positive relationships with public support. Percent LPR had a practically, though not 
statistically, significant negative relationship as well wherein a one percentage-point increase 
in LPR led to a 8.14 percentage-point decrease in public support. As with granting legal 
status, the Plains region was the sole region to garner statistical significance. For increasing 
border patrol, states in the region had a 5.77 boost in public support. 
 
Fining businesses covaried with a number of unexpected variables. Education system 
strength, year, percent population in urban areas, percent unemployment, percent LPR, and 
median household income all played a significant role in this model. Additionally, the Far 
West region (-5.83) joined Plains (6.91) in statistical significance, though Far West resulted 
in lower support while states in the Plains had higher support. Education system strength (-
0.39), year (-0.95), and percent LPR (-15.62) had negative relationships, meaning that higher 
education, more recent years, and higher immigrant contact all resulted in lower support for 
fining businesses. A percentage point increase in urban proportion by state, unemployment 
rate, or median household income resulted in 0.21, 1.49, and 0.33 respective increases in 
public support. 
 
Whether or not to fine businesses that hire illegal immigrants showed no clear trend over 
time. Perhaps that means that the public feels unsure about this policy altogether. Part of this 
ambiguity exists because of the policy’s unknown externalities, both positive and negative. In 
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order for individuals and lawmakers to make informed decisions on this matter, the public 
must have a greater understanding of the topic and its long-term tradeoffs. 
 
Both increasing border patrol and fining businesses had significant non-characteristic 
fluctuations in public support in the 2010 survey, likely due to the economic strain of the 
Great Recession. The 2016 survey results showed that the public moved back towards the 
2007 levels of support for both questions. Moving forward, we should monitor whether the 
public support levels off at the 2007 levels or whether support moves past those original 
percentages. 
 
Granting legal status and increasing border patrol had statistically significant relationships 
with political lean but not with %LPR. Conversely, %LPR, but not political lean, was 
significant in fining businesses. Because political lean and %LPR had no overlap in statistical 
significance, further research should consider whether the variables interact or overlap to 
eclipse one another’s significance. 
 
%White and %Latinx do not yield significant results in any of the three models. This 
indicates that race likely plays an insignificant role in immigration public opinion. Because 
34% of the U.S. Latinx population is foreign-born, %Latinx was expected to have a high 
correlation with and act as a proxy for immigrant interaction.33 Instead, %LPR likely 
accounted for any significance of race. Future studies should seek to separate race and 
immigration more effectively. 
                                                
33 Flores, Antonio. "Facts on Latinos in America." Pew Research Center's Hispanic Trends Project. June 13, 
2018. 
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The SPLC Hate Group Tally does not differentiate between different types of hate groups; 
for example, a white supremacist group and a black supremacist group each count as a hate 
group and cannot be separated using the measure. This lack of differentiation could explain 
why SPLC failed to have significance in the models. It is also possible that this particular 
variable’s lack of predictive power suggests that public opinion might not be significantly 
affected by extremism.  
 
On an aggregate level, median age’s significance for granting legal status and increasing 
border patrol confirms an overarching trend: younger individuals are more likely to view 
immigration positively and therefore possess more open-minded views about those entering 
the U.S. in search of opportunity, regardless of legal status. In the future, older voters will be 
replaced by the younger ones, which may begin to move public opinion to the left. This 
majority will likely be pro-immigrant, and, given the rising importance of immigration 
policy, politicians and policymakers might consider shifting party platforms toward pro-
immigrant or immigrant-neutral policies if they intend to capture the demographic. 
 
Individuals in the Plains region hold more anti-immigrant sentiment than the other regions, 
and this should be kept in mind when campaigning.  
 
Immigration policy has always been unique due to its ability to break from party platforms 
more effectively than other policy topics. Additionally, because of the rapid influx of 
immigrants into the U.S. combined with rising xenophobia on a global scale, immigration 
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policy has gained traction as a key policy issue in the United States. This study looked at 
several specific policy proposals within this topic from the state perspective in order to gain 
unique insights and create new policy implications that can be used by both political entities 
and the public moving forward.  
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